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Abstract
Although research into the processes and outcomes of radicalization has
yielded significant discoveries regarding antecedent risk factors and the
role played by societal circumstances and individual variables, research
regarding the process of radical conversion remains in its infancy. We
believe that the psychology of religion may hold the key to unlocking new
insights into this conversion process. As a result of assessing both
Lofland and Skonovd’s religious conversion motifs and Rambo’s
integrative model of religious conversion, we suggest that issues of
culture, society and the individual which are prevalent in first-hand
accounts of conversion to terrorism provide crucial insight into the
application of theories of religious conversion to the process of
radicalization, and that this application is ripe for helping to further
develop existing pyramid and staircase models of radicalization.
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Introduction 
In order to counter violent extremism, efforts must be made to stem the 
tide of new recruits.  To do this effectively, more needs to be known about 
the radicalization processes involved in people altering their beliefs and 
moving towards engaging in violent extremism.1  With regards to these 
issues, the present article will initially explore the antecedent factors of 
radicalization and involvement in violent extremism, which are well 
supported by research.  The article will then suggest how research from 
the psychology of religion could be incorporated into this work to provide 
a model for further exploring radicalization and engagement in terrorism. 
 
Since 9/11 there has been an increase in both the supply and demand for 
research focusing on terrorism, and the rise of Islamic terrorism.  A 
particular fascination has been with the psychology of the terrorist and the 
radicalization process that transforms normal young men into fanatics 
determined to kill for ideology.2  Unfortunately, research on terrorism and 
radicalization has a tendency to lack adequate data or utilize poor 
methodological practices.3  This poor practice, the problematic nature of 
the terms under investigation—such as ‘terrorism’ or ‘radicalization’—plus 
the lack of dedicated researchers working in the area, has led to a media-
centric focus purveying incorrect assumptions of psychological instability.4  
 
A comprehensive review of the research suggests that an understanding of 
a terrorist’s mind and motivations requires a more thorough and 
comprehensive analysis of factors; an analysis that moves away from the 
readily available intra-individual explanations toward an understanding of 
social factors and the socio-political history of the community that play 
into the radicalization process.5  Although much research is hindered by its 
reliance on secondary data, or lack of direct contact with the individuals in 
question, there have been salient discoveries made by researchers.6  
 
                                                     
1 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism I: A review of social science 
theories,” Journal of Strategic Security 4 (2011): 7-36. 
2 Horgan, John, The psychology of terrorism (London: Routledge, 2005). 
3 Ibid; Andrew Silke, “The Devil you know: Continuing problems with research on 
terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (2001): 1–14. 
4 Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism”; Andrew Silke, “Preface” in A. Silke 
(ed.), Terrorists, victims and society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and 
its consequences (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2003), xiii–xxi; Mark 
Burgess, Neil Ferguson and Ian Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From 
discontent to action,” in Marget Sönser-Breen (eds.), Minding evil: Explorations of 
human iniquity (Amsterdam/New York: Rodolpi, 2005), 19–38. 
5 Jeff Victoroff, “The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological 
approaches,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49:1 (2005): 3-42. 
6Andrew Silke, “Cheshire-cat logic: The recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in 
psychological research,” Psychology, Crime and Law 4:1 (1998): 51-69. 
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Antecedents of Terrorism 
Research has developed a range of antecedent risk factors that consistently 
have the potential to increase the likelihood of individuals’ involvement 
with terror groups or a campaign of armed insurrection.7  Many of these 
factors are well documented, for example, the repeated existence of a 
grievance or perceived injustice by a subgroup of the population.8  Age and 
gender are also important considerations, with terrorist acts generally 
committed by young males aged fifteen to twenty-five.  Jihadist 
movements primarily focus their recruitment on unmarried males in their 
late teens or early twenties.9 
 
An individual’s family and friends having a past involvement with or 
showing support for the movement have also been shown to be key, with 
strong bonds with family and friends, rather than behavioral disorders, 
suggested as the key motivating factor for young Muslims joining the 
jihad.10 Indeed recent research discussed by Bond has further 
demonstrated that three out of every four foreign fighters currently 
travelling to Syria to fight, do so as clusters of friends.11 
 
High levels of community support for the insurgent group is commonly 
cited as an important factor in radicalization.12 Being a terrorist places 
                                                     
7 Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From 
discontent to action”; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of 
political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism,” Terrorism & Political Violence 
20 (2008): 425:433. 
8 Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From 
discontent to action”; Martha Crenshaw, “The causes of terrorism” in Charles W. 
Kegley, Jr. (ed.), The new global terrorism: Characteristics, causes, controls (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 92-138. 
9 Andrew Silke, “Becoming a terrorist,” in A. Silke (ed.), Terrorists, victims and 
society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences (Chichester, 
England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 2003), 29–53; Horgan John, “The search for the 
terrorist personality,” in A. Silke (ed.), Psychological perspectives on terrorism and 
its consequences (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2003), 3-27. 
10 Rachel, Brett and Irma Specht, Young soldiers: Why they choose to fight (UK: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004); Colin, Crawford, Inside the UDA: Volunteers 
and violence (London: Pluto Press, 2003); Anne Speckhard, “Defusing human 
bombs: Understanding suicide terrorism,” in J. Victoroff (Ed.), Tangled roots: Social 
and psychological factors in the genesis of terrorism (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006), 
277–291; Sageman, Mark, Understanding terror networks (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
11 Michael Bond, “Why Westerners are driven to join the jihadist fight,” News 
Scientist, September 10, 2014, available at: 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329861.700-why-westerners-are-
driven-to-join-the-jihadist-fight.html#.VQLIAvysX_E. 
12 Mark Burgess, Neil Ferguson and Ian Hollywood, “Rebels’ perspectives of the legacy 
of past violence and of the current peace in post-agreement Northern Ireland: An 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis,” Political Psychology 28:1 (2007): 69-88; 
Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita M. Denny, “The terrorists in their own 
words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 15 (2003): 171–184. 
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immense physical, psychological, and social burdens on the individual; 
they can be isolated, face death, or imprisonment.13  Yet these risks are 
outweighed by gaining status, respect, and esteem within their community 
and the possibility that membership may also bring financial and/or 
sexual rewards, as well as increased social status.14 
 
One of the most consistent findings from research dealing with the reasons 
people engage in terrorism is having a need for vengeance or reporting a 
desire to ‘hit back’ and right wrongs.15  The personal histories of armed 
insurgents from across the globe are frequently filled with stories about 
incidents in which they, their acquaintances, or communities are 
victimized by ‘the other’—pushing the protagonist to take action, seek 
revenge, and join an armed group.  
 
The routes into violence may be long, and eventual membership tends to 
be the result of an incremental process of increasing acts of insurgence.16  
This process may start with relatively mundane behavior such as stone 
throwing or spray painting graffiti before progressing to destroying 
property and finally becoming involved in injuring and killing opponents.17 
For example, many of the paramilitaries and ex-combatants Ferguson, 
Burgess, and Hollywood interviewed discussed how they would begin on 
the fringes of the conflict, perhaps running with gangs and getting 
involved in riots, before being approached by or approaching armed 
groups and becoming involved in assassinations or bombings.18 
 
However, while the route into engaging in a terror attack may be long, 
many current and former combatants report the importance of ‘critical 
incidents’ or ‘trigger moments’ in directing them down this route.19  These 
critical incidents were normally attacks on themselves, their family or the 
                                                     
13 Neil Ferguson, Mark Burgess and Ian Hollywood, “Who are the Victims? 
Victimhood Experiences in Post Agreement Northern Ireland,” Political Psychology 
31:6 (2010): 857-886. 
14 Horgan, The psychology of terrorism; Silke, “The Devil you know.” 
15 Ibid; Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism I; Laia Balcells, “Rivalry and 
revenge: Violence against civilians in conventional civil wars,” International Studies 
Quarterly 54 (2010): 291-313; Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social 
psychology of defiance”; Silke, “Preface” in Terrorists, victims and society; Horgan, 
“The search for a terrorist personality”; Bond, “Why Westerners are driven to join the 
jihadist fight”; Silke, “Becoming a terrorist”; Rachel and Specht, Young soldiers: Why 
they choose to fight; Speckhard, “Defusing human bombs”; Burgess, Ferguson and 
Hollywood, “Rebels’ perspectives of the legacy of past violence”; Post, Sprinzak and 
Denny, “The terrorists in their own words.” 
16 Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From 
discontent to action.” 
17 Anthony Oberschall, “Explaining terrorism: The contribution of collective action 
theory,” Sociological Theory 22 (2004): 26–37. 
18 Burgess, Ferguson, Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From discontent to 
action.” 
19 Ibid; Horgan, The psychology of terrorism. 
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wider community they identified with.  For example, Burgess et al. report 
examples of former Northern Irish Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries 
whose narratives pinpoint their involvement due to violent trigger events.  
Likewise, Horgan reports that ninety percent of militants from the Swat 
Valley in Pakistan included a drone attack as a trigger moment in their 
narratives of becoming involved.  While these recollections of critical 
incidents fuelling recruitment into armed groups were widely reported and 
also recognized by non-combatants, the retrospective nature of research 
makes it difficult to unpack whether this choice of rationale is accurate or 
devised to justify the violent actions undertaken as a militant.20 
 
Witnessing violence against family, friends or the wider group an 
individual identifies with, directly, indirectly or vicariously could suggest 
that exposure to these events may cause trauma and possibly Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  Speckhard further argues that these 
traumatic events can also cause dissociation (a feeling of separation from 
the body, thoughts, perceptions and/or emotions), which has been offered 
as an explanation for a number of cognitive responses to trauma.  Such 
trauma may cause an individual to become fixated on revenge and the 
defense of the group regardless of risk to one’s life or well-being.21 
 
Clearly, wishing to join an armed group involves identifying with the 
people that the group represents, so prospective members need to perceive 
themselves as categorically interchangeable with other in-group members.  
This heightened identification allows them to become stereotypical in-
group members, taking on the group ideology, culture, and values.  
Research has also revealed how, in addition to the individual strongly 
identifying with his or her group, identification with role models who 
support the actions of the armed group is important in sustaining and 
committing the individual to political violence.  Burgess and colleagues 
found that some Northern Irish paramilitaries were moved to engage in 
political violence due to ‘idols’ in their community openly supporting 
armed confrontation.22  After interviews with members of armed 
Palestinian groups, such as Hamas, Post et al. reflected upon how the 
interviewees had upheld religious figures who espoused violence or 
revolutionaries such as Ché Guevara as heroes.23  
 
                                                     
20 Ibid. 
21 Speckhard, “Defusing human bombs: Understanding suicide terrorism”; Etzel 
Cardena and David Spiegel, “Dissociative reactions to the San Francisco Bay area 
earthquake of 1989,” American Journal of Psychiatry 150 (1993): 474-478. 
22 Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social psychology of defiance: From 
discontent to action.” 
23 Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, “The terrorists in their own words.” 
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Research evidence on the role of ideological commitment to a ‘cause’ in 
driving engagement in violence, however, has been mixed.24  Recent 
research on the role of ideology in pushing people towards involvement in 
politically motivated violence has argued that devotion to sacred political 
or religious values, particularly when they are fused to a collective identity, 
are important factors in distinguishing those willing to fight and die, from 
those who are less willing.25 
 
Additionally, numerous other antecedent factors were reported, which 
received less attention or garnered less support, such as a need for a 
reduction of uncertainty, to overcome cognitive and emotional dissonance 
or create more limited ‘black’ versus ‘white’ choices, which help simplify 
the world into good and evil, the just and unjust, heretic and true 
believer.26  Kruglanski and colleagues also suggest that a quest for personal 
significance constitutes a major motivational force in pushing individuals 
towards violent extremism.27  
 
Many of these antecedent factors can be seen to play a role in the detailed 
accounts of jihadists such Mubin Shaikh, former al-Qaida (AQ) 
sympathizer and undercover counter-terrorism operative for the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service.  Shaikh was involved in the arrest of the 
Toronto 18 in 2006 and suggested the perceived injustices in his life, his 
crisis of identity and his need to right the wrongs as he saw them played 
into his decision to join AQ.28  While Mohammed Emwazi aka ‘Jihadi 
John’ who is currently fighting in Syria with the Islamic State (IS) forces, 
reported systematic harassment by the British Security Services to an 
advocacy group and points to events during his arrest in Tanzania as a key 
                                                     
24 Sageman, Understanding terror networks; Bond, “Why Westerners are driven to 
join the jihadist fight”; McManus, John, The deadly brotherhood: The American 
combat soldier in World War II (New York: Presidio Press, 2003) 
25 Scott Atran, Hammad Sheikh and Angel Gomez, “For cause and comrade: Devoted 
actors and willingness to fight,” Cliodynamics 5:1 (2014): 41-57; Wagdy Loza, “The 
psychology of extremism and terrorism: A Middle-Eastern perspective,” Aggression & 
Violent Behavior 12 (2007): 141-155; Francisco G. Sanin, Elizabeth J. Wood, 
“Ideology in civil war: Instrumental adoption and beyond,” Journal of Peace 
Research 51 (2014): 213-226. 
26 Michael J. Hogg and Janice Adelman, “Uncertainty-identity theory: Extreme 
groups, radical behavior, and authoritarian leadership,” Journal of Social Issues 69 
(2013): 436-454; Hudson, Rex A. The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who 
becomes a terrorist and why? Federal Research Division (Washington, D.C.: Library 
of Congress, 1999), 20540-24840.  
27 Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Belanger, Ama Sheveland, 
Malkanthi Hetiarachchi and Rohan Gunaratna, “The psychology of radicalization and 
deradicalization: How significance quest impacts violent extremism,” Advances in 
Political Psychology 1 (2014): 69-93. 
28 Speckhard, Anne and Mubin Shaikh, Undercover Jihadi: Inside the Toronto 18 – 
Al Qaida Inspired, Homegrown, Terrorism in the West (McLean, VA: Advances 
Press, 2014). 
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critical trigger moment.29  While Emwazi’s claims are contested, they 
illustrate that narratives around perceived injustices, collective identity, 
and critical incidents persist in individual accounts of radicalization, and 
as social psychology has consistently shown us, what people believe is a 
motive for their conduct is at least as important as the actual sequence of 
events.  
 
While this search for an understanding of how an individual can become 
radicalized into committing politically or religiously motivated violence is 
in its infancy, the search for a model of the conversion process, where the 
individual goes from a place of non-engagement to one where he is 
committed to the organization and involved in their activities, is not new 
and many well-researched suggestions have been made regarding this 
process.30  The psychology of religion may offer new insights into this 
conversion process, drawing on established frameworks to offer a deeper 
and more thorough understanding of the process of radicalization.  
 
Viewing Radicalization through Religious Conversion Motifs  
Similar to the area of terrorism, the psychology of religion is a complex 
and multi-dimensional phenomenon.  The process of religious conversion 
has many similarities with the processes involved in radicalized 
conversion.31  For example, both conversions are arguably a 
transformational process whereby the individual goes from believing in 
and adhering to and/or practicing one set of values/teachings, to believing 
in, adhering to, and practicing another set of values/teachings.32  Similar 
to radicalization, religious transformation also occurs in a ‘dynamic force 
field’ of people, events, ideologies, institutions, expectations and 
experiences.33  Importantly, the research within the psychology of religion 
suggests several major types of conversion that resonate with examples of 
radicalization.  
 
Lofland and Skonovd identified six unique religious conversion motifs, 
each of which offers a distinct, defining experience that makes the process 
of conversion discrete and individual, and which echoes the antecedent 
factors discussed previously.  The six motifs that they suggest are: 
                                                     
29 “Case file: Mohammed Emwazi,” Cage UK, May 1, 2015, available at: 
http://www.cageuk.org/case/mohammed-emwazi. 
30 Borum, “Radicalization into violent extremism I.” 
31 Hood, Ralph W., Bernard Spilka, Bruce Hunsberger and Richard Gorsuch, The 
Psychology of Religion (New York: Gilford Press, 1996). 
32 Raymound F. Paloutzian, “Religious conversion and spiritual transformation: A 
meaning-system analysis,” in Raymond F. Paloutzian and Crystal L. Park (eds.), 
Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality (New York: Guilford, 2005), 
331-347. 
33 Raymound F. Paloutzian, James T. Richardson and Lewis R. Rambo, “Religious 
conversion and personality change,” Journal of Personality 67: 6 (1999): 1047-1079. 
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intellectual, mystical, experimental, affectional, revivalist, and coercive.34  
While these motifs will be discussed individually, it is important to 
remember that many converts will combine aspects of multiple motifs in 
their conversion. 
 
Intellectual conversion involves the pursuit of knowledge about the group 
that the individual plans to join, although this knowledge is usually 
derived from secondary sources (books, media, etc.) rather than from one-
on-one contact with people that can lay claim to group membership.  In 
terms of radicalization processes, this would clearly map onto the routes of 
many Islamist militants from Europe and elsewhere who initially engaged 
with IS, or jihadist sites online in what Neumann refers to as ‘self-
recruitment’ were an individual becomes radicalized ‘virtually’ without 
personal contact with other likeminded individuals or militant groups.35 
 
Mystical conversion is viewed as the prototypical conversion motif, and is 
exemplified by Saul’s conversion to Paul whilst on the road to Damascus 
and reported in Acts 9 in the New Testament Bible.  Mystical conversion 
involves a critical event or period of stress which triggers a dramatic 
feeling of change and signals the onset of new beliefs and behaviors 
associated with the new religion.36  
 
While Lofland and Skonovd title this conversion ‘mystical’, it should be 
viewed as ‘transformational’ as it comprises of a cognitive rather than 
spiritual re-organization.  The philosopher Jaspers also recognized the 
importance of these “grenzsituationen” or “boundary situations” created 
by having to deal with a situation that prior knowledge or rational 
objective reasoning cannot prepare a person to overcome.37  Jaspers 
believed having to deal with these critical events (such as facing death, the 
death of a child, or an inevitable struggle) causes a radical change in an 
individual’s thinking, rousing them from normal spontaneous instinctive 
thinking, creating a radical change in personality and worldview in which 
they take responsibility for their new future.  This ‘Pauline’ motif is very 
similar to the critical incidents reported by Northern Irish paramilitaries 
and Swat Valley militants discussed earlier in this article, and resonate 
                                                     
34 John Lofland and Norman Skonovd, “Conversion motifs,” Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion 20:4 (1981): 373-385. 
35 Neumann, Peter R. “Joining al-Qaida: jihadist recruitment in Europe,” Adelphi 
Paper, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: IISS, 2008). 
36 Lofland and Skonovd, “Conversion motifs.” 
37 Jaspers, Karl, Existential Elucidation, vol. 2 of Philosophy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1970). 
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with Liht and Savage’s view of radicalization processes that involve 
fomented changes in integrative complexity.38  
 
Experimental conversion involves the individual actively exploring their 
religious options where the individual may ‘try on’ different aspects of the 
new beliefs, experimenting with the ideologies and practices before 
deciding on one.  Kse and Loewenthal, in a study of British Muslim 
converts, found that sixty percent of the converts reported ‘trying out’ 
different aspects of Muslim religious practice, such as dress, prayer, diet, 
abstention from alcohol or sexual relations before committing to the 
faith.39  Interestingly, Richard Reid, aka the shoe bomber, initially 
converted to Islam for better prison food, before joining Brixton and 
Finsbury Park Mosques on his release.  For terror converts, this behavior 
may also involve assessing the available active groups and comparing their 
ideologies, courses of action, and track record before making a conversion 
decision.  
 
Affectional conversion highlights the importance of interpersonal 
relationships in the process of conversion.  Indeed, Lofland and Skonovd 
argue that personal attachments or a strong liking for members of the 
convert’s new faith are central to the process of driving that conversion.  
As discussed earlier, interpersonal and familial links are well documented 
antecedents to joining armed groups.40  
 
Revivalist conversion relies on the use of crowd conformity to generate 
conversion behavior, making use of powerful and emotive speeches and 
witnessing family and friends exerting direct pressure on the individual to 
convince them to convert.  Research with Loyalist paramilitaries illustrates 
the role that protest marches and political rallies organized by Protestant 
demagogues such as Ian Paisley in radicalizing and mobilizing individuals  
to join loyalist paramilitary groups in conjunction with other conversion 
processes.41 
 
                                                     
38 Horgan, The psychology of terrorism; Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood, “A social 
psychology of defiance”; Liht, Jose, Savage, Sara. “Preventing violent extremism 
through value complexity: Being Muslim being British.” Journal of Strategic Security 
6, no. 4 (2013): 44-66. 
39 Ali Kse and Kate M. Loewenthal, “Conversion motifs among British converts to 
Islam,” International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 10 (2000): 101-110. 
40 Rachel and Specht, Young soldiers: Why they choose to fight; Speckhard, 
“Defusing human bombs”; Sageman, Understanding terror networks; Bond, “Why 
Westerners are driven to join the jihadist fight.” 
41 Neil Ferguson and James W. McAuley, “Ulster Loyalist Accounts of Armed 
Mobilization, Demobilization and Decommissioning,” in Lorenzo Bosi and Gianluca 
De Fazio (eds.), The Troubles: Northern Ireland and Social Movements Theories 
(Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, pending publication).  
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Coercive conversion, sometimes previously known as ‘brainwashing’, was 
conceived of as being rare by Lofland and Skonovd because specific 
conditions are required for it to take place, including but not limited to 
food and/or sleep deprivation and, in more severe cases, psychological and 
physical torture.  Although outright coercive conversions may be rare, 
depending on the amount of social, personal, or familial pressure brought 
to bear on the individual, many conversions could be said to contain an 
element of coercion.  Similarly, while many individuals volunteer to join 
armed groups, some, such as child soldiers, are clearly coerced, while 
others face Hobson’s choice and join groups because they have no other 
obvious means of dealing with the poverty and precarious existence they 
face in under developed or chaotic war torn countries. 
 
Utilizing Conversion Motifs 
It must also be remembered that Lofland and Skonovd highlight that there 
is not necessarily one single path to conversion, but that the process is 
necessarily multi-layered and complex.  So, the present authors often find 
a combination of motifs reported amongst converts, for example, Kse 
and Loewenthal demonstrate that British Muslim converts report a 
combination of intellectual, experimental, and affectional motifs in their 
biographies. 
 
Rambo builds on Lofland and Skonovd motifs to create an integrative 
model of conversion which considers the role of cultural, social, personal, 
and religious systems in charting an individual’s conversion experience 
(see Table 1).42  The stages involved in Rambo’s systemic stage model map 
very closely onto the well-known antecedents of terrorism: With the 
demographic suggestions and history of perceived injustices identified by 
any number of radicalized individuals represented by the Context; the 
critical incident identified by researchers closely resembling the Crisis 
stage; and with the incidents encountered at this stage having the potential 
to lead to intentional engagement (Quest), prior to making contact with 
the new movement (Encounter), and interacting with this movement in a 
meaningful and deliberate way (Interaction).  The subsequent identity 
construction and assimilation into the movement (Commitment) leads to 
the consolidation of the identity and experiences and an intention to act 
(Consequences).  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
42 Rambo, Lewis R., Understanding Religions Conversion (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1993) 
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Table 1: Rambo’s (1993) Integrative Model of Conversion 
Stage of Conversion 
Process 
Factors to be Evaluated 
1. Context Historical, religious, social, cultural and 
personal factors are assessed based on their 
ability to promote or impede conversion 
2. Crisis Personal / social (or both) disruption that 
stimulated quest 
3. Quest Intentional engagement with crisis and its 
resolution  
4. Encounter Recognition of and contact with new 
movement 
5. Interaction Multi-layered extended exchange between 
convert and movement 
6. Commitment Construction of new identity and become a 
valid member of the movement 
7. Consequences Conversion as a result of new commitment 
and consolidation of experiences, identities 
and commitments 
 
This systemic stage model highlights the complex and multifaceted conditions 
that combine to result in radicalization.  Each of the stages are visible to 
varying degrees in the cases of individuals who have experienced the process 
of radicalization, from al-Shabaab supporter Zachary Chesser’s 
acknowledgement of the social context as a key driver in his radicalization to 
the well-documented online encounters with IS activists by three underage 
girls who fled the United States in 2014 to join IS in Syria.43  The 
consequences of successful completion of these stages are all too evident, 
when the commitment to new identities, beliefs, and ideologies manifest 
themselves in the bombing of public areas, the murder of civilians, and the 
intent to further proselytise.  
 
If religious conversion motifs are useful in aiding the understanding 
radicalization, it would appear that Rambo’s suggestions provide a rational 
and effective starting point—issues of culture, society, and the individual 
are important not only to religious conversion, but are prevalent in the 
first-hand accounts of conversion to terrorism by researchers that have 
sought face-to-face interactions.  We suggest that those interested in 
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understanding or countering this process should explore these motifs 
further to help develop the models of radicalization based on pyramids or 
staircases which are currently utilized.44 
 
Conclusion 
To understand radicalization and engagement in violent extremism, 
researchers and policy makers require comprehensive models which 
incorporate micro, meso, macro and exo factors, such as intra-individual 
psychological motivations, community influences and the role of ideology 
in the analysis.  To achieve this, we propose that scholars and practitioners 
examine research from across the globe that focuses on a range of groups, 
both active and disbanded, to explore the processes evident in people who 
engage in violent extremism.   
 
While viewing this process as a transformation from non-engagement to 
active commitment, we believe that exploring the psychology of religious 
conversion research offers useful insights and models for understanding 
these processes at a variety of levels of abstraction, while integrating a 
variety of conditions, factors, and actors into the analysis.  Radicalization 
and religious conversion share many similarities and the conversion 
motifs and models offer ready templates that can assist in building and 
managing the understanding of the complex, multifaceted radicalization 
processes currently taking place.  
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